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MMAWC, LLC v. Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 38 (Sep. 5, 2019)1
Summary
The Court determined that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempted NRS
§ 597.995, which required any agreement containing an arbitration provision to also provide
affirmative authorization to the arbitration by the agreement’s parties. 2
Background
I.
In 2012, a licensing agreement was entered between MMAWC, LLC, d/b/a “World
Series of Fighting,” and Hesser, who later assigned his license rights to World Series of Fighting
Global, Ltd. (“WSOF Global”). Shawn Wright, the trustee of Zion Wood Obi Wan Trust, was
the president of WSOF Global, as well as a member of MMAWC. Various parties were drawn
into litigation, eventually entering into a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement
“provided that the settlement agreement was the entire agreement between the parties.” It also
provided that the license agreement would be “reaffirmed and remain in full force,” as well as be
amended to include an arbitration clause.
The plaintiffs, collectively called Zion, filed a complaint against MMAWC and others
(collectively, MMAWC), claiming that MMAWC had breached the licensing agreement, which
amounted to breaching the settlement agreement. MMAWC moved to have the complaint
dismissed and compelled to arbitration. MMAWC argued that “the settlement agreement
incorporated the licensing agreement and, by extension, the arbitration provision.” However, the
parties disagreed on whether the arbitration agreement complied with NRS § 597.995. They
further disagreed over whether the FAA preempted NRS § 597.995.
The district court denied MMAWC’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration because it
found that the licensing agreement’s arbitration clause did not comply with NRS § 597.995.
MMAWC appealed.
Discussion
II.
NRS § 597.995 provides that an arbitration provision “must include specific authorization
for the provision which indicates that the person has affirmatively agreed to the provision.” 3 The
absence of the affirmative agreement renders the arbitration provision void and unenforceable. 4
The issue in this case was whether the FAA preempted NRS § 597.995. The Court
reviewed this issue, as well as other questions related to statutory construction, de novo.
Under the FAA, arbitration provisions are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 5 This
Court has recently reiterated the sentiment held by the United States Supreme Court that “when
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the FAA applies, it preempts state laws that single out and disfavor arbitration.” 6 Arbitration
agreements cannot be subjected to stricter requirements than would typically be subjected to
other general contract provisions. For instance, a Montana law was preempted by the FAA when
it required a notice of an arbitration provision to be typed in capital letters on the first page of the
contract.7 This type of notice requirement had not been required of other contract provisions,
thus resulting in the arbitration provision being held to a stricter requirement.
Here, NRS § 597.995 provided another such instance where a state law required a stricter
and special requirement that had not been extended and required of other contract provisions.
The Court held that NRS § 597.995 was preempted by the FAA. Thus, the district court erred in
voiding the arbitration provision based on NRS § 597.995.
However, another issue presented in this case was whether the specific claims asserted in
the complaint fell within the arbitration provision. Specifically, did “the settlement agreement
incorporate[] the licensing agreement and its arbitration provision?”
III.
According to May v. Anderson, contract law’s general principles apply to settlement
agreements. 8 When facts are not in dispute, contract interpretation require de novo review.9 A
contract is enforceable as written when it uses clear and unambiguous language.10 Critical to the
interpretation of the contract is the intent of the parties. 11 Any ambiguity will be interpreted
against the drafter.12 Intent will be interpreted by looking at the four corners of the contract.13
“[W]ritings which are made part of the contract by annexation or reference will be so construed
. . . .”14
After reviewing the agreements and arguments made by the parties, the Court held that
the arbitration clause applied to the complaint’s asserted claims. The district court erred by not
enforcing the arbitration clause. The language of the settlement agreement was plain, such that it
expressly provided that it would incorporate the licensing agreement and the licensing
agreement’s arbitration provision. The very language of the settlement agreement exempted the
licensing agreement from the settlement agreement’s dispute provisions, thus keeping the
arbitration provision intact. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the very fact that Zion brought a
cause of action for breach of the licensing agreement itself, meant that Zion was bound to that
agreement’s arbitration provision. “Zion’s claims relate directly or indirectly to the license, and
the arbitration provision requires arbitration of any disputes related either directly or indirectly to
the license.”
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Conclusion
IV.
The Court held that NRS § 597.995 was preempted by the FAA for singling out an
arbitration provision and requiring of it a stricter standard than what was typically applied to
other general contract provisions, specifically that it requires specific authorization by the
parties. The district court was incorrect in using NRS § 597.995 to label the arbitration provision
as unenforceable. Further, the arbitration clause applied to the plaintiff’s claims laid out in the
complaint. The Court accordingly reversed and remanded the case to the district court. It
specifically ordered the district court “to grant MMAWC’s motion to dismiss and enforce the
arbitration clause.”

